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ABSTRACT

Rose, Douglas P. M.S., Department of Economics, Wright State University, 1995.
Historical Review of Social Security and its Effect on Personal Savings.

Social Security has left its indelible mark on the American culture, however there still
remains considerable debate over the effect it has had in curtailing personal savings for the
express purpose of providing for one’s retirement. This study begins with a review of the origins
of the modem Social Security system and critiques previous attempts at trying to quantify its
impact on personal savings habits. While most previous attempts have aimed to construct a
future benefits variable in order to measure this effect, it is presumed in this model that current
observations and experiences with Social Security are the most significant factors in determining
an individual’s level of preparation for retirement.

Of particular concern is the effect

information about several important Social Security factors has had in determining the aggregate
level of personal savings for the nation. Under certain conditions, several of these factors seem
to have a significant effect on the level of personal savings and each has its own measurable
impact on the marginal propensity to save.
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CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 1995, debate raged in the halls of Congress over a proposed amendment
to the Constitution that would have required the federal government to operate within a balanced
budget. What ultimately sent this measure to an early grave was not a lack of support from the
American populace nor an insistence on the part of our elected representatives to continue the
rampant deficits of the past. The fatal flaw was a proposed measure to cut spending through
modifications to the existing Social Security system. The mere mention of increasing the eligible
retirement age or decreasing benefits created such a firestorm of protest that even the most
powerful government officials were left cowering in its wake.
Sixty years after its initial implementation, Social Security has not only established itself
as the largest single government program, but also has emerged as an American icon just as
recognizable as the stars and stripes. Conceived in the financial ruin of the Great Depression,
America’s venture into social insurance has survived despite decades of fierce criticism and
attack. It’s success has been due in large part to its ownership by each of the citizens of the
country. Unlike most government programs which exist upon a portion of the general taxation
revenues, the Social Security system has a direct link to working citizens forged by their
earmarked contributions. Those only slightly familiar with the system understand that a portion
of every paycheck is “invested”, so that they may reap the benefits once retirement age is
attained. The promise of this eventual retirement stipend is so coveted that the program is often
times known as the “third rail” of American politics, fatal to all those that unwittingly try their
hand at reforming the system (Hage 1995).
The establishment of a federal social insurance program has had a direct impact on the
American culture. Before the establishment of Social Security, the concept of a preordained
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retirement age was a foreign concept to most workers. One merely tried to stay employed until
such time as their families agreed to take care of their basic necessities or they ran out of
employment options. Today, the age of sixty-five is almost universally accepted as the entry
point into retirement because it is at this time that a majority of Americans start to receive
benefits from the Social Security Administration. The evolution of this system has coincided
with other factors that have left their indelible mark upon the fabric of our culture during the last
half century. Tremendous population growth, medical advances that prolong life expectancies,
periods of enormous economic growth coupled with the dramatic slowdown experienced over the
last few decades. What has evolved is a system that has had to be modified greatly to meet the
promises made to the original recipients, all the while creating an uncertain future for
tomorrow’s beneficiaries.
The impact of Social Security on the individual in our society has been much more
difficult to determine. By establishing a “guaranteed” retirement stipend, one could surmise that
individuals would no longer have the impetus to provide for their own golden years and instead
rely on the promise of future benefits. Many models that have aimed to prove just such an
assertion have produced some very ambiguous results. Much of the difficulty lies in quantifying
the actual amount of savings that is specifically related to retirement. Similarly, efforts that aim
to illustrate the benefits attributable to Social Security have also yielded questionable results.
Much of this difficulty lays in the methodology chosen, relying on assumptions that may have
been true in the Depression years but are no longer valid six decades hence.
In order to properly gauge the impact that Social Security has had upon our culture, it is
important to first investigate the economic and political climate in which it was first formulated
and later evolved.

Chapter II presents this historical review of the modem Social Security

system. Chapter III continues with several derivations of the personal savings function and a
review of the past attempts to quantify the effect Social Security has had upon personal savings.
2

Chapters IV presents the development of a new model which will quantify the effects of this
guaranteed government stipend on aggregate personal savings while taking into account
alternative methods of investment. Chapter V reviews the empirical results gained from this
endeavor and the potential economic consequences of the findings. In Chapter VI we will
conclude with a look at the challenges that will confront the Social Security system in the years
ahead and will examine some potential avenues for reform that are currently at the disposal of
our elected representatives.

3

CHAPTER II: EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Early Influences on American Social Insurance
The Social Security system owes its successful enactment to the ravages brought on by
the Great Depression of the 1930’s. However, the origins of a nationalized social insurance
program are to be found even before the turn of this century. In fact, old-age insurance programs
had already been established in Europe a full half century before the United States became the
last industrial country in the world to enact a program that aided the elderly (Ferrara 1985). In
1893, the United States first explored the concept of social insurance when the Commissioner of
Labor was directed to review a system established by the Chancellor of Germany some ten years
earlier (Nash 1988). Although nothing significant came of this early venture, the onslaught of
worker’s revolution movements across the globe brought to light the needs of employees not just
in their working years, but also after they had exhausted their productive capacities. In 1911, the
Commissioner of Labor was again directed to publish a comprehensive survey that detailed the
social insurance programs gaining popularity in Europe (Nash 1988). Even though it would take
quite a number of years before any serious attempt was made to implement such a plan on the
federal level, several states enacted similar programs based on the successes that had been
occurring across the Atlantic.
From the onset, such compulsory insurance plans were met with scom and ridicule and
were even considered by some to be wholly un-American.

In 1910, the Massachusetts

Commission on Old Age Pensions described mandatory social insurance as “unthinkable and
distasteful” (Ferrara 1985).

Later that decade Samuel Gompers, the powerful head of the

American Federation of Labor, described a proposal for such a system as being “in its essence
undemocratic” and pledged to assist in the “inauguration of a revolution against compulsory
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insurance” (Ferrera 1985). What makes this statement especially intriguing is the fact that most
compulsory insurance programs, including Social Security, were marketed as being to the benefit
of the average worker, which one would assume would also be of interest to a powerful labor
party. In 1924, the Pennsylvania Chamber of Commerce described the growing popularity of
compulsory insurance plans as “un-American and socialistic and unmistakably earmarked as an
entering wedge of communist propaganda”. The emergence of a social insurance plan that would
be acceptable to the American populace would have to be in response to a great catastrophe,
given the deep seated mistrust of such a system.
In October of 1929, such an enormous calamity did strike the nation and the need for
government assistance became exceedingly apparent. Even with the world in such a disastrous
economic state, it would take six long years before legislation finally brought forth the reality of
compulsory insurance. The first national referendum for such a change was the brain child of
Louisiana Senator Huey Long (Nash 1988).

In 1934, he founded the Share-the-Wealth

movement and quickly enrolled five million members who were discontent with the statis quo.
Senator Long’s assassination a short time later slowed the expansion of this initiative, but it gave
valuable evidence to President Roosevelt that a ground swell of support existed for programs that
guaranteed a basic standard of living. Many of his earlier supporters later joined the Old Age
Revolving Pension Fund movement, led by Francis Townsend, which advocated a $260 a month
federal pension for all individuals over the age of sixty. Grassroots efforts such as these ensured
that the issue of compulsory social insurance would be a hotly debated issue during the upcoming
presidential election of 1936.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt had long been an advocate of the social reforms that
were then thriving in Europe. However, political savvy told him that without the requisite
populist support, such a radical program would be doomed to failure as opponents invoked the
“red scare” threat in brandishing his plans. To make a social insurance system acceptable in this
5

country, it had to be devoid of any overtones of state paternalism or socialist ideologies of
redistribution (Nash 1988). After witnessing the success of Senator Long and the documented
victories of several state-run insurance programs, Roosevelt now had the confidence that the
nation was ready for such monumental reform. He was also determined to ease the grip the
depression held over the country and knew citizens were willing to try virtually anything, just as
long as it produced some meaningful results. However, the depression also brought about the
seemingly insurmountable problem of how to pay for such a far reaching new bureaucracy,
especially in light of the fact that one in every five able bodied persons were no longer employed
and therefore did not pay income taxes.
Roosevelt brought together the brightest members of his personal staff as well as select
academic experts in the fields of business and economics to construct a program that guaranteed
citizens a basic security against the uncertainties of life. The panel was sent forth in its mission
with the following words from the president:
I am looking for a sound means which I can recommend to provide at once
security against several of the great disturbing factors in life - especially those
which relate to unemployment and old age. I believe that there should be a
maximum of cooperation between states and the federal government...
These three great objectives - the security of the home, the security of
livelihood, and the security of social insurance - are, it seems to me, a minimum
of the promise that we can offer to the American people. They constitute
a right which belongs to every individual and every family willing to work.
They are the essential fulfillment of measures taken toward relief, recovery
and reconstruction (Nash 1988).
The commission realized that the greatest threat facing a wage earner was the loss of
employment and the associated income earned. To mitigate the risk of such uncertainty, it was
recommended that the federal government take steps to safeguard the citizens against the
hardships of unemployment by stimulating private investment and providing public jobs during
such times when industry cannot remain fully employed (Report 1935). The additional demands
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on the elderly of meeting their financial obligations was also addressed at length by the
commission in its findings:

The need of the people of this country for some safeguard against misfortunes
which cannot be wholly eliminated in the man-made world of ours is tragically
apparent at this time, when 18,000,000 people, including children and the aged,
are dependent upon emergency relief for their subsistence and approximately
10,000,000 workers have no employment other than relief work. Many millions
more have lost their entire savings, and there has occurred a very great decrease
in earnings (Report 1935).
The commission ultimately recommended a monumental bill that would cover each of
the societal shortfalls detailed in their report. The original Social Security Act was delivered to
Congress as a single piece of legislation containing ten distinct sections. The first six titles
provided the basis for old-age assistance and insurance, unemployment compensation, aid to
children under economic duress, and the establishment and maintenance of adequate public
health services. The remaining sections outlined the taxation provisions to fund such reforms
and delegated responsibility to the newly formed Social Security Administration (SSA).

In

addition, a small provision in the original bill called for need based assistance to the blind, the
only categorical disability specifically addressed by the commission. After much internal debate,
it was determined that compulsory health insurance would ultimately doom an already radical
piece of legislation. The future inclusion of health care was to be accomplished by the SSA soon
after the enactment of the original bill was accomplished (Nash 1988). To date, neither the SSA
nor any other government agency has been successful in passing an amendment to the original
bill that would mandate compulsory health care coverage for all Americans.
Roosevelt was adamant in protecting the guarantees provided through Social Security
from future generations of politicians bent on raiding its coffers for their own personal benefit.
To accomplish this objective, he found it necessary to establish an alternate method to finance
such an enormous undertaking. If the newly devised social insurance system were to be paid out
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of the general revenue fund, it would most assuredly be in the perilous position of being
diminished or canceled during each budgetary review. Instead, Roosevelt and his allies looked to
the original definition of the program to determine the optimal funding approach; that is a
protection for working individuals against the uncertainties and hardships to be encountered
during their life.

Contributions by the employees represent a self-respecting method through
which workers make their own provision for old age. In addition many workers
themselves on the verge of dependency will benefit through being relieved of the
necessity of supporting dependent parents on reduced incomes, and at the expense
of the health and well-being of their own families. To the employers, contributions
toward old-age annuities are very similar to the revenues which they regularly set
aside for depreciation on capital equipment (Report 1935).
In the construction of this funding mechanism, the administration not only provided a
more than adequate method by which to finance their social insurance plan. They had also
developed a valuable counter argument to the popular criticism that such a plan was merely an
entry into a more paternalistic society.

J. Douglas Brown, an original member of the

commission, stated that it was their goal to “provide a mechanism whereby the individual could
prevent widespread dependency through his own efforts” (Nash 1988).

Although such

opportunities were already available in the private market, it was evident that such a voluntary
approach had failed to prevent widespread dependency in old age for most of the American
population (Nash 1988). The responsibility for providing a basic level of support would be
directly attributable to the efforts of the working population, not as a blatant government hand
out. Originally, the combined contributory rate from a worker’s payroll was recommended to be
one percent divided equally between employers and employees. It was to be increased by one
percent at five year increments until the maximum rate of five percent was reached a full twenty
years after the implementation of the program (Report 1935).

A system that is financed through the lifetime contributions of the employed members of
a society has a major difficulty from its inception. Namely, how does the government provide
benefits for the individuals that will retire shortly after its implementation, since they have not
had adequate time to build a reserve to meet the basic obligations of retirement. The concept
derived to answer this dilemma is credited both with creating widespread initial support for the
program as well as possibly causing its eventual bankruptcy if it is allowed to continue in its
current state. Working individuals would not actually build a reserve for their own benefit, but
would instead provide the necessary resources for the segment of the population that had already
reached the age of retirement. This “pay-as-you-go” concept was originally envisioned to build a
sizable reserve for use by subsequent generations of retirees. Any surplus funds that were gained
from payroll taxes would be “invested” in the Social Security Trust Fund, an interest bearing
account financed through the purchase of treasury notes. The enactment of the Social Security
system would not only refrain from using general revenues at the expense of other government
programs, it’s surpluses could be used to meet the immediate needs of these other government
programs through the purchase of these bonds.
Each of the components of the initial American venture into social insurance was
designed to mitigate the impact that misfortune would have on the earning potential of the
individual. Unemployment insurance was instituted as a bridge to span the period that a worker
was temporarily not earning a wage. Special provisions were included to provide for the welfare
of children during such times that their guardians could not support their most fundamental
needs. Likewise, the old age insurance portion of Social Security was conceived as insulation
against the inevitable hardships that would befall an individual who no longer could provide
productive services and had no other type of savings. All of the major industrial countries
enacted such measures to provide a subsistence floor of protection against the major risks
threatening a discontinuation of wages. It was only after World War II, that this original concept
9

gave way to the notion that social protection was a basic human right of all citizens (Nash 1988).
In their report to the president, the commission concluded that the costs of destitution and
dependency that result from an elderly population not properly cared for were a huge burden to
society. In considering the substantial costs of the proposed Social Security measure, the impact
of reducing this level of destitution should be coupled with the avoidance of a dependency class
of retirees in gauging its true value to our society (Report 1935).
As debate ensued during the 74th Congress, well illustrated was the plight of fifty
percent of the over sixty-five population who were then considered dependent on their family’s
goodwill or the charitable contributions of society (Nash 1988). The deliberations were tautly
drawn along party lines, which favored the president given the Democratic majority in both
chambers.

However, most politicians were fully aware of the hardships endured by their

constituents; ravaged by an unrelenting economic calamity without prospect for gainful
employment and quickly running out of options.

Many conservatives were not convinced,

however, that such a monumental reform did not simply alleviate the misery of the current
generation by mortgaging the future prosperity of subsequent generations. To answer these
allegations, the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee stated that the proposed system of
old-age insurance “comports better than any substitute we have discovered with the American
concept that free men want to earn their security and not ask for doles - that what is due as a
matter of earned right is far better than a gratuity...Social Security is not a handout, it is not
charity, it is not relief’ (Nash 1988). The president also garnered support by illustrating his
program’s likeness to another dearly held American institution:
So, also security was attained in the earlier days through the interdependence of
members of families upon each other and of the families within a small
community upon each other. The complexities of great communities and
of organized industry make less real these simple means of security. Therefore,
we are compelled to employ the active interest of the Nation as a whole through
government in order to encourage a greater security for each individual who
composes it (Cohen 1985).
10

The president thought that the struggle to guarantee such vital protections for the
citizenry was above the petty political debates that could potentially undermine his best
intentions. Therefore, he invoked his powerful vision for meeting the challenges laid out by the
forefathers of our country:
Fear and worry based on unknown danger contribute to social unrest
and economic demoralization. If, as our Constitution tells us, our Federal
Government was established among other things, ‘to promote the general
welfare’, it is our plain duty to provide for that security upon which welfare
depends (Cohen 1985).
The immediacy of a catastrophic societal problem and the full attention of the President
of the United States enabled such a monumental piece of legislation to be debated and enacted in
only six months. Several attempts were made to belabor the basic bill with provisions that would
either cause its bankruptcy or greatly hinder its full implementation. Interestingly enough, one
such

provision, proposed by a Senator Clark, is still being considered today as a viable

alternative to the existing system. Under his amendment, employers were to be given the option
of disregarding the compulsory public system if they provided comparable retirement protection.
An opponent observed that this was the equivalent of the government “inviting and encouraging
competition with its own plan which would ultimately would undermine and destroy it” (Ferrara
1985). It was the issue of allowing competitive interests in the provisioning of Social Security
that had to be ultimately debated in conference and delayed the final passage of the entire act.

Evolution o f a Modern Social Security System
The enactment of the Social Security Act in 1935 did not quell the debate over how the
implementation of a social insurance plan would affect the historic individualism of American
society. Even after it had been signed into law, it was to remain a major issue of the presidential
campaign during the next year. Republican candidate Alfred Landon alluded to the program as
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“a fraud on the working man. The savings it forces on our workers is a cruel hoax.” (Nash 1988)
Bolstered by the citizens’ acceptance of a plan that alleviated their suffering and several Supreme
Court rulings that established the power of the federal government to collect payroll taxes to such
an end, Roosevelt went on to soundly defeat his Republican challenger that fall.
Only four years after being signed into law, the first of many subsequent amendments
were added to its original framework. The original intent was to only insure the lost earning
potential of wage earners and it was presupposed that these individuals would provide for the
needs of their immediate family. However, it was overlooked that many individuals perished
before they reached the age of retirement, thereby leaving their dependents without any access to
their many years of contributions. The first of these amendments added benefits for survivors
and dependents; the widows, children and other surviving family members of wage earners in
order to circumvent the destitution that would surely result if no provisions were made.
Over the next several decades, other amendments were enacted to expand the reach of
Social Security to eventually encompass virtually the entire working population. The original act
covered only employees of established businesses in providing for a mandatory retirement
benefit. As the program gained prominence and more workers became aware of the advantages
of a guaranteed retirement stipend, lobbying efforts to expand the realm of coverage began. In
1950, benefits were offered to all private sector employees not previously covered, state and
local government employees not covered under an existing retirement plan, and self-employed
individuals who were not farmers. Four years later, coverage was extended to all state and local
government employees and farmers on an elective basis. Over the next decade, professional selfemployed individuals such as physicians were offered the opportunity to enroll in the burgeoning
program.

In 1983, the last such expansion was undertaken with benefits being offered to

employees of non-profit organizations and federal employees, including elected officials.
Currently, over 90% of the work force is enrolled in social security.
12

Only government

employees who have chosen not to contribute or were covered under a previous plan and some
low wage earners are not now covered by the largest of government programs (Nash 1988).
Over the first six decades of its existence, the growth of the social security system was
not solely caused by the need supply stipends to an ever expanding roll of beneficiaries. Elected
officials have also amended the original bill to provide for increasing amounts of benefits and
have subsequently had to increase the bite on payroll taxes. The original estimation was that the
fully funded system would ultimately require a five percent payroll deduction that would be
equally split between employer and worker. However, the taxation rate has increased ten times
since 1950 (Hull 1995). Currently the payroll tax rate stands at just under thirteen percent and
many believe that in order to guarantee a basic level of support for future retirees, this rate will
surely increase. By the calculations of one estimate, for all of the post World War II generation
(Baby Boomers) to receive benefits comparable to the current levels, taxes on workers would
need to rise to 45% of wages by the year 2030 (O’Reilly 1995). Remember again that the Social
Security system is funded apart from the general taxation revenues of the federal government, so
this figure does not include other marginal taxes on the federal, state, and local levels.

A

substantial amount of the benefit increases can be attributed to economic conditions that could
not be foreseen in the original estimations; periods of economic growth, high inflation rates,
recessions, and the like. However, there is also evidence that the early successes of the program
created the enviable political position of increasing entitlements for constituents without
seemingly impacting any other segment of society. Given the overwhelming ratio of workers to
retirees during the initial decades of the program, Congress found it especially easy to raise
benefits every few years while having only a minimal impact to the extremely healthy trust fund
(Hull 1995). What was not foreseen, or was completely ignored, was the dangerous proposition
of continually raising the level of entitlements that future generations would be expecting to
receive.
13

As the Social Security system has evolved into its current state, it has witnessed many
monumental changes in the fabric of our society. The United States and the world were enduring
the hardships of deplorable economic conditions when the original act was signed. Rampant
unemployment, depleted savings accounts, and a general uncertainty about future livelihood were
the rule rather than the exception. The nation readily accepted the promises of the Social
Security Act; protection against the ravages of long term unemployment, providing for the
welfare of their children when they could not, and a retirement stipend that could be used to ward
off the destitution that awaited most of the elderly population. Less than a decade later, however,
the United States had just defeated two formidable enemies and in doing so had replenished the
demand for labor to provide for the military’s needs. The expansion of the economy continued
as returning soldiers arrived with demands for more homes, automobiles, and other domestic
goods. As more and more of these workers became employed, the Social Security system reaped
the rewards of deducting a portion of these expanding payrolls.
The returning soldiers also summoned an increase in the demand for child rearing
supplies. Our country experienced population growth rates that had never been seen prior to this
period and have never been approached since. This “Baby Boomer” generation has accounted
for a great deal of the subsequent economic development of our nation through the productive
services they have rendered. In addition to the statis quo work force of the first part of this
century, comprised mostly of white males, progressive legislation and enlightenment have
extended employment opportunities to women and minorities. The expansion of this pool of
labor has created many more participants in the Social Security system, all contributing to a
growing trust fund and providing the means for increased payments to current beneficiaries.
The current Social Security Trust Fund can confidently boast about billions of dollars in
reserves due to long years of favorable ratios of workers to beneficiaries. However, Social
Security will always be a slave to demographics and this may ultimately prove to be the fatal
14

blow to this American institution.

The problems now being faced by the system cannot

conceivably be solved within its current structure. The tax burden of today’s workers cannot be
reduced because the revenues are needed to finance the benefits for the current stream of retirees
(Ferrera 1985).

The newer retirees are especially adamant about receiving their share of

entitlements since they have effectively paid into the system from the start of their working lives.
Receiving the same level of benefits as past recipients is only expected, even though these
benefit levels were originally promised at a time when they could be delivered with minimal
impact to the overall economy. The future benefits for today’s workers cannot be raised since
maintaining even current stipend levels will be extremely difficult to finance. The impending
problems can only be solved through real, fundamental reform, breaking from the traditions of
the original system (Ferrera 1985).
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The Reasons Behind Personal Savings
The impact that compulsory social insurance has had on the savings activities of the
general populace has been a bone of contention since the inception of Social Security. The
problem in adequately measuring this impact is in trying to determine each individual’s motives
for saving in the first place. Theoretically, workers aim to save current income for use at a later
date in order to mitigate the risks that are inherent with an uncertain future. The Life Cycle
Theory, proposed by Albert Ando and Franco Modigliani (1963), presumes savings and
consumption activities are orchestrated during one’s working years in order to support
consumption during retirement when a steady stream of income is no longer available (Ando and
Modigliani 1963). The establishment of an estate to bequest to the next generation of heirs is the
cornerstone of some savings plans. However, many individuals pass away while only leaving
debts behind. Saving current income can also provide a method of consumption spreading to
meet the demands of reduced future earnings and periods of accelerated consumption. College
education for one’s children and providing a retirement nest egg are the major concerns for
individuals with the foresight to devise such a plan. Lastly, individuals forego spending the
entire amount of their income in order to guarantee that resources will be available for
unpredictable circumstances they may encounter at some later date. Although very similar to the
previous motive, there is no definite goal associated with such a plan, only the knowledge that
life is full of expensive uncertainties (Munnell 1974).
The difficulty of determining the true motive behind a savings activity is compounded by
the fact that individuals have different goals depending on what is of immediate concern during
particular stages of their life. Younger families are preoccupied with the establishment of a
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household and the potential purchase of their own home. As individuals progress into the middle
years of their life, the focus of their savings activities is often directed to ensuring the
continuation of their children’s education at a college or university. Once these obligations have
been met, it is only then that many individuals focus on the next major milestone of their lives,
namely retirement (Munnell 1974). The immediacy of such important concerns and the litany of
other uncertainties that befall an individual over the course of one’s lifetime ensure that personal
preparations for retirement are most often woefully inadequate.
The impact that Social Security has had on these personal retirement preparations may
also hinge on one of the key unresolved analytical issues in economics. We have assumed all
along that each individual has a planning horizon that enables them to foresee future impacts to
their income and orchestrate current consumption in order to meet these objectives. However,
that may not be the case for even a majority of individuals (Aaron 1982). Until now, we have
based our assumptions on the life cycle model of personal savings. People will base their
decisions to save, offer their supply of labor and engage in other economic matters depending on
the anticipated levels of lifetime wealth, earning potential, and the accumulation of interest and
dividends on their savings. For many, a daily model may be a more accurate representation of
their perceptions on the need to save. The planning horizon for these individuals stretches a few
years, months, or even days ahead. The actions of government, such as compulsory social
insurance, or events that will occur in the distant future have virtually no impact on their current
economic behavior
(Aaron 1982).
An extensive debate has taken place over whether Social Security has a
significant impact on capital formation and on the supply of labor. The
outcome of the debate, as far as I know is still in doubt (Nash 1988).
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Previous Attempts to Quantify Effect on Savings
The traditional argument contends that when individuals are assured a minimum level of
retirement support, they will be more inclined to spend freely while they are working and worry
less about saving for their golden years (Munnell 1974). This follows the neoclassical position
on Social Security which asserts that individuals placed under a compulsory savings program
will generally react by reducing their own private savings (Munnell 1974). In 1957, Dr. Henry
Aaron conducted some of the earliest research on these interactions and found a highly
significant negative relationship between savings rates and Social Security expenditures
(Munnell 1974).

He did caution against the assigning of a causal relationship and when

regressions were run only a few years later, the signs remained negative but the variables were no
longer significant.
In 1965, Phillip Cagan analyzed the savings behavior of over 15,000 members of the
Consumer’s Union.

Although not as scientifically rigorous as Dr. Aaron, he nonetheless

concluded dhat compulsory insurance plans create a “recognition effect”. Individuals will be
more prone to pay attention to the prospect of distant activity such as retirement if they are
forced to worry about their future prospects at an earlier age (Munnell 1974). Therefore, the
implementation of such programs as Social Security may actually prove to have a positive
influence on the savings rate of a nation, although his findings proved to be inconclusive in this
regard.
During the late sixties the Social Security Administration undertook a massive effort to
survey the recipients of the past three decades on their personal savings habits. Evidence was
gathered that seemed to verify the hypothesis that individuals retiring in the late 1960’s had
saved more than their counterparts in the late 1930’s (Munnell 1974).
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These results are

somewhat circumspect since the surveyors did not consider the economic and societal changes
that had occurred in just these three decades alone.

The inclusion of corporate retirement

pensions, which gained enormous popularity only after the war, as a savings instrument is an
indication that they were comparing vastly different periods of American history.
A few years later, Lester Taylor used quarterly national income data to conclude that the
typical consumer views compulsory contributions as substitutes for their own personal savings
and subsequently reduces these savings two dollars for every one dollar paid in payroll taxes
(Munnell 1974).

The results were met with staunch criticism due to the fact that he used

aggregate spending on all social programs as a proxy for compulsory insurance and he assumed
that individuals had a propensity to save .90 of every dollar that they had lost through transfer
payments.
In 1974, Martin Feldstein conducted quite possibly the best known attempt to effectively
quantify the impact that Social Security benefits have had on the nation’s savings patterns (Aaron
1982). Based on extensive time series data, Dr. Feldstein concluded that the nation’s savings
rate had been decreased by 38% due to such mandatory mechanisms as Social Security. Instead
of directly measuring the impact of the savings rate, he choose to perform regressions on
consumer expenditures. Since consumption and savings are inversely related, a positive effect on
current spending would be akin to a negative impact on savings, given that the variables were in
fact significant. This decision was also made in light of the fact that consumption data is more
readily available and usually more concise than comparable data on savings rates. The rest of the
equation included variables corresponding to disposable personal income, gross undistributed
corporate profits, per capita household net worth, and the present value of Social Security
benefits. This last variable was found to be significant and raised the current consumption level
by .38 units.

However, the introduction of regular business cycle factors, such as the

unemployment rate, acted to reduce the affect that Social Security benefits had on consumption
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and deteriorated its statistical significance. This certainly raises questions about the true impact
that a single input such as Social Security could have on the economy when more robust models
are constructed.
From just this sampling of empirical studies, one can quickly see the difficulty in
drawing a relevant conclusion about the direct effect compulsory insurance has had upon the
national savings rate. While some results do conclude that such an interaction is statistically
significant, the introduction of other relevant economic factors quickly diminished the seeming
significance of their findings. There have been so many drastic changes that have come about in
the economic and political framework of the United States over the course of the last sixty years.
As a result, it is virtually impossible to conclude, with a large degree of confidence, that one
single factor such as Social Security has had a significant affect on the savings rate over the
course of this time.
Also impacting the validity of these results is the almost universal assumption that
individuals would save regardless of the existence of compulsory measures such as Social
Security.

If most individuals are personifications of the daily model of savings with the

extremely short planning horizons, then the implementation of the Social Security system may
have had no measurable effect on their established habit of avoiding the saving of a portion of
their disposable income. In fact, as Philip Cagan earlier asserted, the existence of a mandatory
contribution system may have at least enlightened a great many people that retirement is a
concern worth noting.
Perhaps the most popular notion advanced to justify Social Security is
the claim that without the program people will not provide for retirement of
other insurance contingencies. People are short-sided, the argument goes,
and will not think far enough ahead to provide adequately for retirement.
At most this justifies only a simple requirement that all individuals save
some portion of their income for retirement and other contingencies, but
not necessarily through Social Security. Individuals could instead be allowed
to choose among private alternatives, just as drivers in most states are
required to carry car insurance but can choose to purchase it from any
of many private insurers (Ferrara 1985).
20

Critique o f Established Models
Martin Feldstein garnered the most attention, as well as the most criticism, for his
estimation techniques in gauging the true impact of Social Security on the level of personal
savings. Feldstein builds the foundation for his model with the belief that savings, or negative
consumption as he defines, should be positively correlated to the level of disposable personal
income that a person earns in the course of a given year. In addition, he also presupposes that
accumulated personal net wealth will have a negative influence on the desire of an individual to
save a larger proportion of their income (Elmeskov 1991). Since the savings instrument is
predominantly utilized to mitigate the effects of future uncertainties, a base of considerable
wealth could presumably also be used for the same purpose. Therefore, the accumulation of net
wealth in its various states of liquidity should have a negative effect on the savings patterns of an
individual.
Utilizing this logic, Feldstein further asserts that future Social Security benefits are
considered as wealth by the majority of American citizens (Elmeskov 1991). Even though most
working citizens will receive no tangible benefits from Social Security until they reach the
mandated age of retirement, the government’s assurances of a stipend is considered to be part of
their accumulated wealth in much the same way as established investments or owned real estate.
Feldstein goes on to identify the primary independent variable in his model as Social Security
wealth and bases his findings on its significance. His preliminary hypothesis presupposes that
this variable will be significant and positively correlated with the dependent variable which is
consumer expenditures. Since it can confidently be assumed that individuals will either expend
or save their disposable income, the positive influence on the consumer expenditure rate is to be
regarded as a negative impact on the personal savings rate.
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Feldstein’s model ultimately hinged on how he defined the variable corresponding to
Social Security wealth. While the benefits received by each of today’s retirees can be calculated
with some degree of precision, it is exceedingly difficult to determine what stipends await future
generations of retirees. Retirement benefits are composed of a worker’s personal income history,
the age at which they will begin collecting these benefits, and the legislation that governs the
Social Security Administration at the time the stream of benefits are initiated. This simplistic
summary fails to take into consideration such exogenous factors as political influences, the
health of the trust fund, and rising price levels over the course of one’s employment history.
Ultimately, a great many assumptions are necessitated by the gross uncertainty of the general
state of the Social Security system at any given time in the future. In addition, each individual’s
circumstances could be vastly different in regards to both assumed Social Security wealth and its
effect on their personal savings habits. In order to aggregate this data to establish an overall
impact on the national savings rate, further assumptions need to be made in establishing an
“average” beneficiary or weighted sum of all beneficiaries.
Feldstein ultimately built this critical variable by multiplying the real personal disposable
income in a given year by a constant benefit ratio and further multiplied the resulting figure by
the weighted sum of persons covered under the system (Elmeskov 1991). This last portion of the
equation is based upon future projections of age, sex and marital status.

The subsequent

regressions revealed that this manufactured variable was indeed significant and increased the
dependent variable of consumer expenditures on the order of 38%. However, the significance
was shown to be fragile at best. Two Social Security Administration economists, Dean Leimer
and Selig Lesnoy (1982), later refined the model, in particular adjusting the Social Security
wealth variable to correspond to the agency’s established practice of estimating future benefit
levels (Aaron 1982). This central cog in Feldstein’s model became insignificant when exposed
to these small refinements. Further model adjustments that aimed to include cyclical influences
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of the economy, proxied by the unemployment rate, and estimated for different periods of Social
Security's existence also deteriorated the significance of the variable corresponding to assumed
Social Security wealth.
The model developed by Feldstein had as its central argument that an individual's future
anticipation of Social Security benefits would impact their current habits in regards to saving
disposable income for retirement.

The complicated nature by which future benefits were

determined illustrates a fundamental problem in ultimately determining this impact. One must
assume that individuals would have a basic idea of their future levels of benefits in order to
properly orchestrate their current savings levels to compensate for this future level of wealth. If
numerous economists holding advanced degrees from the finest institutions in the country cannot
begin to agree on the basic construction of these future benefits, it is not exceedingly obvious
that the average American worker can clearly curtail their spending habits by an amount equal to
this predicted future Social Security wealth. The tenuous nature of this variable also illustrates
the effect that such exogenous occurrences as business cycle fluctuations can have on
determining the true impact of Social Security on the personal savings rate of this country.
Shortly after the publication of Feldstein’s controversial results, Alicia Munnell
constructed a model that aimed to account for the induced retirement effect of Social Security, an
item that was notably absent in his model (Yon Furstenberg 1979). Munnell based her model,
much as Feldstein had previously, on the basic Ando-Modigliani function which defined savings
as being most influenced by disposable income and net wealth (Munnell 1974).

However,

Munnell went a step further and also utilized the components of the recently theorized expanded
function which included such variables as lagged net wealth, long term interest rates, inflation
rate, and the unemployment rate. Munnell’s final model consisted of the dependent variable of
per capita savings regressed against per capita disposable income, urban work force,
unemployment rate, private wealth lagged one period, Social Security contributions, percent of
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work force affected by compulsory retirement, percent of work force covered by private
pensions, and percent subject to Social Security benefits test (Munnell 1974).
One last variable was of foremost importance to the resulting equation and that was the
ratio of retirement years to the sum of retirement years and working years. Central to Munnell’s
argument was the premise that Social Security induced an earlier age of retirement and therefore
could influence the savings rate since workers would have to finance a longer period of forced
unemployment. The inclusion of the Social Security contributions variable established a base
upon which workers were expected to build a nest egg and the dependent variable could
conceivably be affected in any number of ways.
Robert Barro (1978) expanded the original variable selection to account for the effects of
past events in molding the savings behavior of individuals in the present (Yon Furstenberg 1979).
Barro introduced a simpler measure of Social Security wealth that was radically different from
those used previously. He simply multiplied the average benefits received per participant in the
system by a ratio of the workers covered by Social Security to the total work force. This gave an
aggregate measure of wealth not dependent on a wide range of assumptions about the future, that
was also weighted to more precisely estimate its impact upon the overall economy.
Barro included in his model several additional lagged variables in order to create a more
dynamic model that was designed to show not just the effects of present wealth accumulation,
but also the effects of past decisions. Consumer expenditures was once again the dependent
variable and the independent variables included disposable personal income both current and
lagged one period, household net worth lagged one period, stock of household durable goods
currently and lagged one period.

Two additional variables were included in the model to

measure the effects of the cyclical nature of our economy. One such variable was derived by
multiplying personal disposable income by the unemployment rate, presumably to show the true
affects of lost wages that could have also been utilized in the pursuit of personal savings goals.
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Barro also included the government surplus or deficit for each year as a broad measure of the
savings behavior of the federal government. The introduction of this variable brings to light the
assumption that an individual's savings behavior may be modeled to a large extent after the
spending patterns of the government.

If citizens are convinced that the government is not

worried about future uncertainties as evidenced by continuing budget deficits, these individuals
may not feel the necessary impetus to provide for their own future.
Michael Darby (1979) was another economist that found fault with Feldstein’s model
and constructed his own through the introduction of more exotic variables. Central to Darby’s
argument was the fact that the decision to save was ultimately based on individual circumstances
confronting each participant in the economy. He delineated between a measure of permanent
income, what one could be expected to earn through the course of their working life, and
transitory income, current income which might be considerably less if the individual had not yet
attained their expected employment potential (Von Furstenberg 1979). Darby also thought that
the majority of an average citizen’s wealth would be displayed through their ownership of
durable goods and their personal savings decisions rested upon their ability to further their stock
of these goods. To illustrate this effect he included variables corresponding to the stock of
consumer’s durable goods lagged one period and the ratio of durable goods prices to non-durable
goods prices.
In order to gauge the impact of the economy on the personal savings rate, variables for
the M l money stock and the nominal rate of long term government bonds were also included in
his calculations. The latter variable also introduced an alternative savings instrument that could
further validate the correctness of the signs in the model as regressed against the dependent
variable, which in his case was consumer expenditures. Finally, Darby included a measure of
Social Security wealth closely resembling the construction in Feldstein’s model.
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What each of these subsequent models has in common is that their findings did nothing
to validate those originally found by Feldstein (Von Furstenberg 1979). To a large extent many
of the variables followed their presumable course, more net wealth and stocks of private goods
negatively affecting the savings rate while more disposable income had a positive impact.
However, the large negative impact of expected Social Security wealth, so noticeable in
Feldstein’s groundbreaking study, was not to be found in any of these subsequent studies. In
fact, the variable corresponding to an expected retirement stipend had no significant effect upon
their given models whatsoever.
The ambiguity of these results further illustrates the difficulty in determining the effect
of one variable such as expected Social Security wealth on the aggregate personal savings rate of
the entire nation. The difficulty in establishing one accepted measure of Social Security wealth
was also evidenced in the differing methodologies utilized by just this small handful of
economists. The conclusions that may be made are that depending upon the composition of the
Social Security wealth variable, the influence can be highly significant as shown by Feldstein or
non-existent as presented by this team of critics. Furthermore, even when the variable is found to
be significant, it is a tenuous position that can be affected by outside influences such as the
nation’s unemployment rate.
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Development o f the Model
Each of the previous attempts at quantifying the effect of Social Security on personal
savings developed their models with the assumption that individuals would forego current
savings due to their knowledge about future levels of benefits to be received.

Only Barro

constructed a variable that questioned an individual’s ability to assimilate the complicated
material in deriving this future benefits figure. He instead assumed individuals utilize knowledge
of today’s Social Security factors in order to orchestrate their savings behavior. In developing
my own model, I seriously doubted that the average citizen had the necessary information to
predict future benefits and thereby arrange current savings to account for this guaranteed stipend.
Given that the models were also burdened with many assumptions that made the resulting
calculations extremely circumspect, I did not feel that another venture into trying to determine
future benefits would yield any valuable insights.
Many individuals assume that their monthly contributions to Social Security are being
put aside into a separate “savings” account, labeled by their Social Security number, that can
only be accessed once they alone reach the mandated age of retirement. Even if an individual
realizes that their contributions are immediately paid out in benefits to today’s retirees, they are
still influenced by the standard of living attained by the current multitude of beneficiaries.
Family members and close friends that are living out of poverty’s reach in large part due to this
steady stream of benefits, may have a strong influence on the current worker who will assume
that they also will be accorded the same basic standard of living once the age of retirement is
attained. Furthermore, news of the Social Security system and its burgeoning trust fund can be
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accessed with relative ease and may have an additional effect on the perceptions of today’s work
force and the role of Social Security in their retirement plans.
All in all, the true impact of Social Security on the savings behavior of workers is
probably not found in some abstract measure of future benefits constructed using many
assumptions that may never materialize. Instead, the effect of Social Security is best quantified
by the perceptions of today’s work force as they evaluate the relative benefits afforded to today’s
retirees. It is through evaluating the current stream of benefits, contributions to the system, and
relative health of the trust fund that individuals are apt to make current decisions on how best to
prepare for their own future.
The evaluation of current Social Security measures of contributions, benefits, and the
surplus of such transactions will have a significant effect on the personal savings habits of the
nation. If found to be significant, these variables will be negatively correlated with the savings
rate as individuals make the assumption that current trends will continue and their retirement will
at least be partly financed by the Social Security system.

Definition o f Variables
In developing a model that would quantify the effects of Social Security on private
savings it is important to determine what other factors may also influence this consumer
behavior. Utilizing the results of the previous work performed by Feldstein, Munnell, Darby,
Barro, and others it is imperative to include such variables that could affect an individual’s
overall outlook on the economy or at least their personal ability to save.
The model was constructed to encompass two different investment strategies; low risk
and high risk. The base of all regressions was comprised of the following variables: Net Wealth,
Federal Spending, Labor-Retiree Ratio, Unemployment Rate, Personal Income, and Personal
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Savings. For the first half of the regressions the lower risk investment alternatives were also
included among the independent variables; Long Term Bonds, Corporate Bonds - AAA Rating,
and Corporate Bonds - BAA Rating.

The rest of the regressions included the higher risk

investment indicators as independent variables; Dow Jones Average and S&P 500 Index. The
investment types were segregated to gain a better understanding about the effects of different
strategies on savings behavior as well as to accommodate the availability of different periods of
data.
The rest of the independent variables used in the model correspond to different measures
of the effects of Social Security. Previous models had tried to determine the effects by deriving a
future benefit expectation based on complicated calculations and fragile assumptions. Instead of
repeating this course, personal savings habits are assumed to be molded by what information
individuals can expect to assimilate today. For this reason I constructed the Social Security
variables to correspond to knowledge that would be at the disposal of most any individual.
These variables are presented as aggregate Social Security Income, aggregate Social Security
Outlays, and Social Security Wealth as measured as the difference between income and outlays.
The final construction of the model occurs as each base regression includes one of the
Social Security factors as an additional independent variable. A total of six regressions are run;
three for the low risk investment alternatives to include each Social Security factor and three for
the high risk investment alternatives to include each Social Security factor. A more detailed
account of each regression and their associated empirical results are included in the next section.
Thus the following model is estimated:
Low - Risk Investment Alternatives:
PS = f ( NW, SSI, FS, RLR, UR, PI, LTB, CRA, CRR)
PS = f (NW, SSO, FS, RLR, UR, PI, LTB, CBA, CBB)
PS = f (NW, SSS, FS, RLR, UR, PI, LTB, CBA, CBB)
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High - Risk Investment Alternatives:
PS = f ( NW, SSI, FS, RLR, UR, PI, DJ, SP)
PS = f (NW, SSO, FS, RLR, UR, PI, DJ, SP)
PS = f (NW, SSS, FS, RLR, UR, PI, DJ, SP)
The expected signs for each of these variables are included in the following variable
descriptions. Since quite a few of the anticipated signs require considerable explanation, this is
more sufficiently addressed within the framework of these descriptions.
Net Wealth (NW): Personal net wealth defined as both financial and tangible holdings
at the end of a given year. Wealth accumulation is central to subsequent decisions on the value
of continued saving especially for such long range goals as retirement. As previously stated, a
large reserve of wealth would predictably decrease the personal savings activities of an
individual. This occurs since savings is seen as an instrument to mitigate future uncertainties and
already possessing an adequate nest egg would allow the individual to fulfill other needs with the
confidence that they are not dangerously close to poverty. Therefore, a negative relationship
should be expected between this variable and personal savings.

Data was supplied by the

Economic Report to the President (1994 Edition) and is presented in 1987 base year dollars.
Data covers the years 1948 to 1993 and is in aggregate form for the entire nation.
Federal Spending (FS): The difference between federal income gained through taxes
and federal outlays provided to programs and to pay the interest on the national debt may affect
personal savings habits in any number of ways. Although Social Security is a government
program, its annual outlays are considered “off-budget” and are not included within this variable,
which only accounts for spending financed by the general revenues. From a symbolic point of
view, citizens may view the government’s reluctance to live within their own means as a
disregard for future uncertainties or an abject confidence that the future will take care of itself.
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Citizens could therefore be expected to emulate the actions of government and give little regard
to their own preparations for the future. Conversely, the continued borrowing by the federal
government to finance the deficit has a “crowding out” effect for private borrowers, effectively
raising the price of available funds for their own financial needs. The effects of this are often
hard to predict; increased costs to businesses and decreased business growth could result or a
more inviting savings environment due to the subsequent increase in interest rates may occur. I
look for this variable to have a negative impact on the savings behavior as citizens become
indifferent to their future and businesses are adversely affected by loss of affordable financial
capital. Data was supplied by the Economic Report to the President (1994 Edition) and is
presented in 1987 base year dollars. Data covers the years 1948 to 1993.
Ratio of Labor to Retirement (RLR): This variable was constructed by dividing the
total labor force (over 16 years of age) by the population of the country that is over the age of 65.
The resulting figure is a measure of approximately how many workers can be expected to support
each former labor force member as they enter the age of retirement and begin to receive Social
Security benefits. Although practically the entire work force is presently covered by Social
Security, this variable should be considered a proxy since this has not always been the case. The
ratio variable will most likely be negative as more workers contributing to an individual’s
retirement stipend allows for the relative ease of increasing current benefits.

This could

adversely affect the preparations for retirement by today’s work force as they would come to
expect the same pattern of benefit increases during their own golden years. Data was supplied by
the Economic Report to the President (1994 Edition) and is presented in 1987 base year dollars.
Data covers the years 1948 to 1993.
Unemployment Rate (UR): The measure of labor force participants unable to find
gainful employment during a given year is one good indicator of the relative health of an
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economy during this period. Feldstein was sharply criticized for omitting this variable in his
original model and its later inclusion did seem to call into question many of his findings. This
variable will be included as a lesson learned from his experiences as well as to build confidence
in the correctness of my model. One would suspect that the unemployment rate would have a
largely negative impact upon the personal savings habits of a country. When an individual is
unemployed, much of their attention is directed to fulfilling daily needs, rather than building a
healthy retirement nest egg. Data was supplied by the Economic Report to the President (1994
Edition) and is presented in 1987 base year dollars. Data covers the years 1948 to 1993.
Personal Income (PI): The amount of disposable personal income at one’s disposal is a
powerful agent in predicting the amount of savings activity that can be expected.

When

disposable personal income is regressed against the dependent variable of personal savings, the
resulting figure should be a positive ratio of marginal income put towards savings. The resulting
changes in this marginal propensity to save, a valuable tool in analyzing a nation’s overall
savings habits, could prove just as valuable in gauging the effects of other independent variables
in the model. As income increases, we should expect the marginal propensity to save to also
increase as more discretionary income is now at the consumer’s disposal. Data was supplied by
the Economic Report to the President (1994 Edition) and is presented in 1987 base year dollars.
Data covers the years 1948 to 1993 and is in aggregate form for the entire nation.
Personal Savings (PS): The dependent variable within the model, it is a measure of the
national household savings accumulated through such instruments as bank accounts, bonds and
investments. It is through the effects upon this variable that I aim to quantify the impact of
various factors of Social Security and determine the interrelationships of various other important
economic variables in developing an accurate representation of savings habits.
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Data was

supplied by the Economic Report to the President (1994 Edition) and is presented in 1987 base
year dollars. Data covers the years 1948 to 1993 and is in aggregate form for the entire nation.
Long Term Treasury Bonds (LTB): The yield on the thirty-year government bond for
each annual period over the course of this time series data set. The variable is represented as the
percentage gain in yield during a given year as measured against the previous year’s yield.
Considered the safest of all investment vehicles, its inclusion in the model is to determine any
direct affects between percentage changes in the rates of return and personal savings habits. The
expected sign for this variable is positive due to the relationship between increased expected
returns and a more favorable outlook upon investment as an alternative to merely holding money.
Data was supplied by the Economic Report to the President (1994 Edition) and covers the years
1948 to 1993.
Corporate Bonis - AAA Rating (CBA): The yield on the highest quality corporate
bonds issued in the economy. The variable is represented as the percentage change in yield for a
given year as measured against the previous year’s yield. Due to the stability of the issuing
companies, these investment instruments are considered only slightly riskier than bonds backed
by the full faith and credit of the federal government. Still, there does exist some risk and
therefore higher yields will be offered to entice potential buyers. Predicting a positive influence
on the personal savings of the nation if this variable is found to be significant. Data was supplied
by the Economic Report to the President (1994 Edition) and covers the years 1948 to 1993.
Corporate Bonds - BAA Rating (CBB): The yield on lesser quality corporate bonds
issued by companies that may be in distress or heavily leveraged in debt.

The variable is

represented as the percentage gain in yield for a given year as measured against the previous
year’s yield.

Still considered investment grade issues, however, with the increased risk of

ownership comes an even greater potential for investment gains. A positive influence should
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develop between the expected gains on these corporate bonds and the personal savings rate, if the
relationship is statistically significant.

Data was supplied by the Economic Report to the

President (1994 Edition) and covers the years 1948 to 1993.
Dow Jones Average (DJ): This variable is a compilation of the prices of the thirty
largest publicly traded companies that comprise this stock index. The variable is represented as
the percentage change in the index for a given year as measured against the previous year's
index.

Another indication of the effect of alternative savings instruments with regards to

personal savings habits, this stock index is quite a bit more riskier than the bond issues and
therefore one would expect a greater return for their investment over the long run. A positive
relationship between this variable and personal savings should develop as higher expected
returns will entice greater amounts of income to be invested. Data was supplied by the Economic
Report to the President (1994 Edition) and covers the years 1955 to 1993.
S&P 500 Index (SP): Another stock price index, this variable is a compilation of the
500 largest publicly traded companies. The variable is represented as the percentage change in
the index for a given year as measured against the previous year’s index. With the inclusion of
many more volatile companies, this stock index is the riskiest investment measure in the model
and should have a positive impact upon the overall personal savings habits of the nation. Data
was supplied by the Economic Report to the President (1994 Edition) and covers the years 1955
to 1993.
Social Security Income (SSI): Measure of the total amount of contributions received
by the Social Security Administration during each year encompassed by the time series data. As
individuals pay into the system through the mandated payroll deduction, many are gaining the
sense that they are putting away for their own future instead of actually funding today’s
retirement rolls. This insistence that preparations are already being made for their future should
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have a negative impact on the personal savings variable as individuals will be reluctant to
duplicate this effort. Data was supplied by the Budget of the United States (1994 Edition) and is
presented in 1987 base year dollars. Data covers the years 1948 to 1993 and is in aggregate form
for the entire nation.
Social Security Outlays (SSW): The amount of aggregate payments made to eligible
retirees for any given year in this time series. Today’s workers are assumed to be affected by the
amount of retirement benefits being guaranteed to retirees as well as the total amount paid out in
any given year. The predicted result will be a negative impact upon savings plans as employees
take for granted that the same stream of benefits will be available when they retire. Data was
supplied by the Budget of the United States (1994 Edition) and is presented in 1987 base year
dollars. Data covers the years 1948 to 1993 and is in aggregate form for the entire nation.
Social Security Surplus (SSS): A measure of the difference between the income gained
by the Social Security Administration and the amount paid out in the form of benefits to current
retirees. News about the relative health of the Social Security Trust Fund may create a false
sense of security and lull many to forego alternative strategies in building retirement savings.
The predicted affect will be a negative impact upon personal savings if this variable does prove
to be statistically significant. Data was supplied by the Budget of the United States (1994
Edition) and is presented in 1987 base year dollars. Data covers the years 1948 to 1993 and is in
aggregate form for the entire nation.
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CHAPTER V: EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF MODEL
REGRESSION #1
Dependent
Variable:
Personal Savings

R-Squared:
.9103

Adj R-Squared:
.8815

Durbin-W atson:
1.990

Intercept

153.80

.6197

No

No

Net Wealth

-0.039

.0009

Yes

Yes

Soc Sec Income

-1.415

.0210

Yes

Yes

Federal Spending

-0.448

.0201

Yes

Yes

Labor-Retirees

13.339

.8516

No

No

Unemployment Rate

-28.102

.0001

Yes

Yes

Personal Income

0.313

.0001

Yes

Yes

Long Term Bonds

140.534

.4800

No

No

Corporate Bonds - A

-601.630

.1152

No

No

Corporate Bonds - B

226.995

.3121

No

No

Summary: The most significant variables, Net Wealth, Federal Spending, Unemployment Rate,
and Personal Income all have the anticipated signs. The Personal Income variable’s estimated
parameter may be interpreted as the marginal propensity to save, in the case of this model
individuals would be expected to save approximately 31% of their marginal income.
Interestingly enough, the Social Security Income variable is highly significant and corresponds to
lessening personal savings by 1.415 units for every unit increase, a much more substantial impact
than the findings of Feldstein’s model had originally suggested. None of the alternative savings
instruments appear to have a significant affect on personal savings according to the results,
although the higher quality corporate bond issues are almost significant at the 10% level.
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REGRESSION #2
Dependent Variable:
Personal Savings

R-Squared:
.8969

Adj R-Squared:
.8638

Intercept

282.713

.3882

No

f'ig

Net Wealth

-0.053

.0001

Yes

Yt.

Soc Sec Outlays

-1.372

.2213

No

No

Federal Spending

-0.4813

.0291

Yes

Ye.

Labor-Retirees

-13.159

.8614

No

No

Unemployment Rate

-21.212

.0036

Yes

Yes

Personal Income

.3409

.0001

Yes

Yes

Long Term Bonds

191.404

.3684

No

No

Corporate Bonds - A

-566.959

.1671

No

No

Corporate Bonds - B

180.911

.4606

No

No

Durbin-W atson :
1.656

Summary: Net Wealth, Federal Spending, and the Unemployment Rate are highly significant
and negatively impact the level of personal savings, as was predicted before the model was run.
Personal Income is also highly significant and parlays into a marginal propensity to save of
approximately 34%. The variable corresponding to Social Security Outlays is not significant so
we have little confidence that the resulting substantial negative impact is indeed statistically
relevant. The alternate types of savings instruments are also insignificant according to the
model’s output.
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REGRESSION #3
Dependent
Variable:
Personal Savings

R-Squared:
.9045

^VariTble"4
Intercept

p£ Z £ r
248.330

P ro l> > T

Net Wealth

Adj R-Squared:
.8738

'

Durbin-W atson:
2.170

.4281

5%
No

Msl io1^ 1 dt
Ho

-0.037

.0035

Yes

Yes

Soc Sec Surplus

-1.428

.0577

No

Y(

Federal Spending

-0.342

.0767

No

Yes

Labor-Retirees

9.959

.8925

No

No

Unemployment Rate

-32.672

.0001

Yes

Yes

Personal Income

0.2300

.0001

Yes

Yt.

Long Term Bonds

138.256

.5018

No

No

Corporate Bonds - A

-666.084

.0923

No

Yes

Corporate Bonds - B

293.476

.2099

No

No

Summary: Net Wealth, Unemployment Rate, and Personal Income are all highly significant and
have the anticipated signs. The Personal Income variable may be interpreted as the marginal
propensity to save, in the case of this model individuals would be expected to save approximately
23% of their marginal income. This is considerably less than the marginal propensity to save
viewed when modeling the effects of Social Security Income or Outlays. The Social Security
Surplus variable is considered significant at the 10% level of confidence and the reduction in the
marginal propensity to save may also be attributed to the effects of this variable since it was the
only one changed from the previous regressions. The Federal Spending variable remains
significant, although at a diminished level. The variable corresponding to high quality corporate
bonds is also significant at the 10% level and has a very large negative effect on personal
savings.
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REGRESSION #4
Dependent
Variable:
Personal Savings

^ V a ria b lr*
Intercept

R-Squared:
.8944

Adj R-Squared:
.8653

^thnalr

Durbin-Watson:
2.206

sigi

r

at

Si“

at

411.852

.1799

No

No

Net Wealth

-0.045

.0010

Yes

Yes

Soc Sec Income

-0.888

.1882

No

No

Federal Spending

-0.345

.0955

Yes

No

Labor-Retirees

-53.254

.4460

No

No

Unemployment Rate

-22.406

.0003

Yes

Yes

Personal Income

0.306

.0001

Yes

Yes

Dow Jones Ave

148.434

.3472

No

No

S&P 500 Index

-7.342

.9653

No

No

Summary; The Net Wealth and Unemployment Rate variables are both highly significant and
have the anticipated signs. The Personal Income variable is also statistically significant and may
be interpreted as individuals being likely to save 31% of each additional unit of income. The
variable corresponding to Social Security Income is not significant, while the variable
corresponding to Federal Spending is marginally significant. Neither of the alternative savings
instruments, in this case the riskier endeavors on the stock market, appear to have a significant
affect on personal savings according to the results.
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REGRESSION #5
Dependent
Variable:
Personal Savings

R-Squared:
.8942

Adj R-Squared:
.8651

Durbin-W atson:
2.035

Significant at

Prob > T
^ igni5 % n t 31

Intercept

PEstimater
453.370

.1326

No

No

Net Wealth

-0.057

.0001

Yes

Yes

Soc Sec Outlays

-1.420

.1954

No

No

Federal Spending

-0.394

.0746

No

Yes

Labor-Retirees

-66.767

.3372

No

No

Unemployment Rate

-17.144

.0109

Yes

Yes

Personal Income

0.3651

.0001

Yes

Yes

Dow Jones Ave

111.198

.4590

No

No

S&P 500 Index

43.586

.7819

No

No

“

S

t "

Summary: The Net Wealth and Unemployment Rate variable are both highly significant and
had the anticipated negative effects. The Personal Income variable is also statistically significant
and may be interpreted as the individuals having a propensity to save close to 37% of each
additional unit of income. The variable corresponding to Social Security Outlays is not
significant, however, the marginal propensity to save is increased from the level attained when
modeling Social Security Income. The addition of this variable could have had a lesser
dampening effect on the propensity to save since this was the only variable changed. The
Federal Spending variable is marginally significant and has the anticipated negative affect.
Neither of the riskier alternative savings instruments appear to have a significant affect on
personal savings according to the results.
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REGRESSION #6
Dependent
Variable:
Personal Savings

R-Squared:
.8892

Adj R-Squared:
.8586

Durbin-Watson:
2.243

Significant at
fe to a ir
490.434

Prob>T

Intercept

.1136

5%
No

10%
No

Net Wealth

-0.050

.0010

Yes

Ye

Soc Sec Surplus

-0.449

.5609

No

No

Federal Spending

-0.273

.1789

No

No

Labor-Retirees

-58.758

.4141

No

No

Unemployment Rate

-23.275

.0010

Yes

Yes

Personal Income

0.2691

.0001

Yes

Yes

Dow Jones Ave

100.773

.5217

No

No

S&P 500 Index

50.949

.7619

No

No

Summary: Net Wealth and the Unemployment Rate variable are both highly significant and
have the anticipated negative signs. The Personal Income variable is also statistically significant
and may be interpreted as individuals being likely to save 27% of each additional unit of income.
The variable corresponding to Social Security Surplus is not significant. However, the marginal
propensity to save is slightly changed from the level attained when modeling straight Social
Security Outlays or Income. The addition of this variable could have negatively impacted the
propensity to save since this was the only variable changed in this particular regression. Neither
of the riskier savings instruments appear to have a significant affect on personal savings
according to the results.
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Review o f Overall Empirical Results
In drawing any conclusions from the results of the model, it is important to first analyze
the similarities that are evident throughout all the regressions and then detail any substantial
differences.

Each of these regressions contained a basic compliment of variables that were

specifically chosen as economic factors that presumably had an effect on the savings patterns of
the country.

Of these basic variables, two remained highly significant throughout all of the

regressions. We cannot, with a high degree of certainty, reject the notion that the level of net
personal wealth and the unemployment rate had a significant impact upon overall personal
savings levels.
The effects of the unemployment rate seem somewhat obvious. An individual that is
confronted with the prospect of not receiving a steady stream of income becomes much more
concerned with the daily challenges of life rather than the prospects of saving for a comfortable
retirement. Returning to our original discussion of savings behavior, these individuals exemplify
the daily cycle of living; that is preparations are only made for the immediate future until some
semblance of solidity returns to their income stream. The impact of the unemployment rate did
appear to be quite substantial. For every one percent increase in the annual unemployment rate
for the nation, aggregate personal savings could be expected to decrease from a low of $21
billion to a high of $33 billion in constant 1987 figures. As a proxy for the general health of the
economy, when the economy grows and the labor pool expands, we can expect more disposable
income to be available for such discretionary items as personal savings.
The impact of accumulated net wealth also seemed to effect personal savings along the
predicted course. The variable corresponding to net personal wealth remained highly significant
during the course of the entire model and had a negative impact on savings. For every one
billion dollar increase in net wealth holdings, personal savings levels could be expected to
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decrease from a low of $37 million to a high of $57 million in constant 1987 figures. The
witnessed impact is almost exactly that which was predicted, as wealth is accumulated the further
need to prepare for future uncertainties through savings becomes diminished. The ratio of wealth
accumulation to savings reduction is approximately 3-5%, depending on the composition of the
other independent variables. One may conclude that building larger reserves diminishes the need
for savings, but every one unit increase in net wealth holdings does not correspond to a reduction
in savings by an equal amount. Instead, some forms of wealth may act as substitutes, however it
will take quite a bit of wealth to fully mitigate the preparation for any future uncertainties.
The effect of the federal balance sheet is a little less intuitively obvious.

For the

majority of the years represented in the time series data, the federal government spent more
money than it received through taxes and otherwise (Appendix 2). Therefore, over this time
period the citizens of this country have grown accustomed to the government disregarding
predictions that such wanton spending habits could burden future generations with an
irrepressible debt load and the associated interest payments.

I hypothesized that citizens

witnessing these spending habits over the course of several decades would began to emulate the
government and become confident that the future will take care of itself. Whether this is indeed
the case, the resulting data points to the fact that federal spending patterns over the course of the
past 45 years have had a detrimental effect on personal savings habits. For every one billion
dollar increase in the federal deficit for a given year, the accumulated personal savings could be
expected to decrease between 273 and 481 million dollars as measured in constant 1987 terms.
However, considering the fact that three of the six regressions yielded a marginally significant
variable, and in one regression the variable did not appear significant, confidence that this is
actually the effect of federal spending is somewhat diminished.
Of the other basic variables used within the model, the ratio of labor force to retirees did
not seem to have a statistically significant effect in any of the cases.
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For each of these

regressions, a negative impact was witnessed. That is, for each additional worker to retiree on
average, the level of savings would decrease by several units. However, without achieving a
level of statistical confidence, we cannot be sure that there was a measurable effect on savings
with respect to this factor.
The model was segregated into two distinctly different classes; variables corresponding
to low risk investments and those corresponding to more riskier endeavors. Interestingly enough,
only one of these variables proved to be significant at an acceptable level of confidence. The
implication being that for the most part personal savings strategies were not affected one way or
the other by the percentage change in yield of index holdings from one year to the next. This
may seem dramatically different as to what one would expect and what has been decreed by
economic theory. Namely, when investment alternatives become more profitable than merely
holding money, consumers will opt for the interest bearing strategies. However, what may have
been overlooked is the simple fact that most individual’s investment decisions are formulated on
the basis of specific securities and bond issues. Even though the nightly news welcomes us every
evening with the latest developments in the Dow Jones Average, it is still merely an index and
one cannot invest their money directly into its coffers. Instead, investment decisions are made on
the basis of experiences with individual stocks and bonds and it is their respective yields that
may prove to be a more significant force in molding the savings behavior of a great many people.
The aggregate measures utilized within the body of the model may have done little overall to
influence investor decisions one way or another and this effect is further verified by the
insignificance of the variables.
One variable corresponding to an investment alternative did appear to be relatively
significant in one of the regressions, and the results were not at all what had been expected. In
Regression #3, the variable corresponding to percentage change in yields for the higher quality
corporate bonds is found to be significant at the 10% level. What is most interesting is that a
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large negative impact upon savings is determined to occur as the corporate issues increase in
yield over the preceding year’s baseline. Savings could be expected to decline by $6.6 billion for
every one percent increase in yield over the preceding year. Why savings would decline in the
face of an investment that is becoming more lucrative is not readily apparent. The increase in
yield from one year to the next may be an indication of other factors that are not particularly
obvious from just this basic model. Corporate bonds usually are forced to increase their yields in
order to compensate for greater risk, however, and investors may not have feel confident buying
more issues during these tumultuous times and may decide to forego savings altogether. The
most important factor for these conservative investors could be the relative stability of their
chosen savings instrument, rather than significant changes in yield from one year to the next.
The focus of the model was to determine the effect that different factors of Social
Security have had upon the personal savings habits of the country. In order to quantify this
effect, variables were used corresponding to Social Security income, outlays and surplus. The
original hypothesis was that current levels of these variables would affect the current savings
behavior of today’s workers as they incorrectly assumed that they were providing for their own
retirement nest egg or that the current stream of benefits are guaranteed for their future
retirement.

Interestingly enough, only two of the regressions yielded a significant Social

Security variable, as evidenced in Regression #1 and Regression #3. In the model corresponding
to the low risk investment alternatives, Social Security Income appeared statistically significant
at the 5% level of confidence. What this means is that we have some level of confidence that the
null hypothesis in this case cannot be rejected, and that the contributions current workers make
into the system may indeed have an impact upon the aggregate personal saving levels for the
nation. This could provide some evidence that many workers are under the false pretense that
their personal Social Security contributions are a form of savings for their retirement and they
will forego alternative strategies due to this belief.

In the next example, the variable corresponding to the difference between aggregate
Social Security Income and Outlays was found to be significant at the 10% level of confidence.
Although we are slightly less assured that the impact of this variable is statistically different than
zero, there is some reason to believe that the level of Social Security Surplus does have a
measurable negative effect on the level of personal savings. News about the relative health of
the trust fund and other associated information could presumably impact current workers by
instilling a false sense of security about the future of their own benefits.
Also of note is the observed impact upon savings due to the inclusion of each of these
variables. The Social Security Income factor seems to reduce savings by 42% while a reduction
of 43% is noted for the surplus variable. This is a slightly larger negative impact than witnessed
by Feldstein in his model, however it only seems relevant in the case where low risk investment
alternatives are also included in the model. In the case of the higher risk investment alternatives,
there does not appear to be any significance attributed to even one of the Social Security factors.
The final independent variable yielded quite possibly the most interesting results of the
entire model. The Disposable Personal Income variable appeared in each regression and was
found to be highly significant in each case. The predicted effects were in fact realized; a positive
impact less than one that may be interpreted as the marginal propensity to save.

The most

interesting aspect is that the Social Security factors, although themselves found to be largely
insignificant, appeared to have a measurable affect on this marginal propensity to save. Given
that only the Social Security variables changed in each family of regressions, it is interesting to
note that the Disposable Income Variable varied quite noticeably among these regressions.
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As seen in the above chart, when modeled against the low risk investment strategies, the
marginal propensity to save varies depending upon the corresponding Social Security factor also
appearing in the regression.

The Surplus variable yields the lowest marginal saving rate of

approximately 23%, while the Outlay variable is associated with the highest propensity to save
which increases to 34%.
In the case of the higher risk investments, the span of difference remains about the same..
Here the marginal rate takes upon a low value of 27% when the Surplus variable also appears in
the regression and increases to 37% when coupled with the Social Security Outlay variable.
Overall, the marginal propensity to save appears to be measurably higher when associated with
the higher risk investment alternatives. One possible conclusion may be that individuals are
more interested in saving a larger proportion of their disposable income when the expected
returns to such investments are noticeably greater. However, without the statistical significance
of even one of the higher risk investment variables, one must be very careful in crediting the
differences in marginal savings rates to this sole factor.
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Further investigation of the relationship between the personal income variable and each
of the Social Security factors also yields some interesting results.

Utilizing the Pearson

Correlation Coefficients, it was found that the Social Security Income and Outlay variables were
very highly correlated with personal income. The reason could be due to the fact that each of
these Social Security factors impacts the disposable amount of income either by decreasing
(Income) the amount or by increasing (Outlay) the amount. The very large correlation measure,
approaching .99 in both cases, is most likely impacted by other factors that are not entirely
encompassed in this model. The remaining Social Security factor was found to be not nearly as
correlated to the value of the personal income variable.
The indication that one independent variable could be correlated with another is also an
early indication of multicollinearity. An affliction of most time-series data models, the effect of
multicollinearity is that witnessed t-statistics will be artificially low and we are unable to reject
the null hypothesis. Further diagnostics reveal that multicollinearity could indeed be a problem
considering the high condition index scores resulting in the model. Each of the regressions
yielded condition index scores in excess of 200, a strong indication that this problem is indeed
present.
Another problem afflicting most time-series data models is that of autocorrelation. In
this case the t-statistics will be artificially inflated and we will be apt to reject the null hypothesis
under false pretenses.

In order to quantify the effects of this problem, the Durbin-Watson

statistic was diagnosed for each regression and is provided as part of the summary statistics. A
review of the data reveals that each regression yielded a Durbin-Watson statistic close to a value
of two, the threshold at which autocorrelation is said not to be a problem. In regards to the
diagnostics ran on the model, it appears that we will be much more inclined to refuse to reject the
null hypothesis rather than inappropriately deem variables as being statistically significant.
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Economic Consequences o f the Model
The impact observed upon the marginal propensity to save could shed an entirely
different light on the debate in measuring the true impact of Social Security.

Previous

explorations of this topic assumed that a direct correlation would be realized between the
variable corresponding to Social Security wealth and the measure used for personal savings or,
alternatively, personal consumption. Economists tried in earnest to prove the existence of this
relationship with a high degree of confidence.

Much effort has gone into constructing

complicated, and consequently, fragile variables that were supposed to correspond to future
Social Security benefits which would be awaiting today’s workers once they finally reached
retirement. It did not seem to matter that the average worker may not be able to comprehend the
calculations and any subsequent perceived effect of their savings behavior becomes highly
questionable. The elusive key would be to find a measure of future Social Security wealth that is
readily accepted as accurate and is such public knowledge as to actually have an effect on the
savings habits of today’s workers.
Instead of focusing another attempt at deriving this elusive measure of future benefits, I
instead decided to look at the effect of current Social Security factors. It was asserted that the
current actions of government in regards to Social Security policies would adversely affect
personal savings as current workers gained a false sense of security about their own future. The
results of this model did not mount confidence that there exists this direct relationship between
Social Security and personal savings.

Instead, only two of the six regressions yielded a

significant Social Security variable, and one of these was at a marginal level. Still, if we were to
look exclusively at the resulting Social Security factors, it would seem that personal tax
contributions do the most to affect the level of savings in this nation, while the relative size of the
trust fund impacts savings to a lesser extent. Paying a portion of income every earning period to
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the Social Security Administration seems to have the most significant impact on the amount
individuals would be expected to invest on their own in the absence of such a system.
What if no clear linkage exists between the noted factors of Social Security and personal
savings? Due to the existence of so many variables that may in fact influence savings, we may
never find this direct link no matter how diligent we are in constructing even more refined
variables to explain the effects of Social Security. This does not mean that this established
government retirement stipend has no influence on savings habits, however. Quite the contrary,
the effects may be more subtly masked in their effect upon the proportion of savings expected
with each marginal increase in disposable personal income.

The individual Social Security

variables do seem to exert influence on the marginal propensity to save, given that all other
variables in the model were held constant.
It is not enough to say that Social Security may have an influence on the marginal desire
to save, but that different factors related to the same system may all exert their own individual
impacts on the level of marginal changes in savings. Individuals can be expected to save the
smallest proportion of their additional disposable income when adjusting to news on the Social
Security Trust Fund. It remains to be seen whether information about its burgeoning coffers
allows consumers to gain future confidence in the prospects for a fully funded retirement stipend
or whether some unknown affect exerts this influence. Conversely, Social Security outlay levels
for each year seem to propel individuals to take a more aggressive approach to saving for some
future uncertainty. A conclusion could be reached that individuals, wary of the news that levels
of benefits and the number of participants in the system are ever expending, may deem it
necessary not to wait and see whether such a system will still be in existence once they enter the
golden years of retirement.
The remaining Social Security factor, that measuring tax contributions, also showed
moderate changes depending upon the investment alternatives that were also included in the
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regression. As the previous charts attest, there are many similarities found in both the levels of
marginal savings and the volatility between the Social Security factors depending on the family
of investments used as a part of the model. The marginal propensity to save is somewhat higher
with respect to the riskier investment opportunities on the stock market.

This leads to the

conclusion that individuals may be enticed by potential greater rewards of investing in stocks.
They would likely forego the prospects of the relatively safe investments including government
and corporate bond issues if they do indeed decide to save a proportion of any additional units of
income. The particular level of marginal income that can be expected to be invested is further
impacted by the specific Social Security factor which mold their views on the system, if we are
to take the results of the model as any indication.
The strong statistical significance of several of the other variables may also provide
insight into the relative economic effects apart from these Social Security factors. Net wealth,
the federal surplus/deficit account for a given year, and the unemployment rate may all exert
strong influences on the aggregate personal savings habits of the nation. What the significance
of these variables really highlights the fact that many influences comprise the overall savings
habits of individuals. It may be quite a stretch to attribute even a causal relationship to a single
factor, such as Social Security wealth. Blindly proceeding under the belief that a single factor
could have such a measurable impact on personal savings could result in hasty policy
conclusions and subsequent economic effects that were never considered.

Critique o f Model and Future Endeavors
To a large extent, the development of this model was a departure from previous
excursions into quantifying the effects of Social Security on personal savings.

Although I

utilized the findings of previous models in order to ensure the inclusion of certain important
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variables, such as the unemployment rate and net personal wealth, it was not my intention to
replicate a construction of an ambiguous value of future benefits. To this extent, the only Social
Security factors that were included were constructed from the level of benefits enjoyed by
today’s retirees and contributions made by today’s workers. However, I may have overlooked
several other important influences in regards to developing an accurate representation of the
personal savings model.
For the most part, individuals cannot be expected to immediately assimilate knowledge
into a far reaching savings plan.

Instead many individuals might take time to accumulate

relevant knowledge and direct their efforts into developing a well planned strategy. Information
regarding the recent, but still historical, nature of investment returns, retirement stipends and the
level of disposable personal income may exert an even stronger influence on today’s savings
habits. Regressions that contain similar data that is lagged for one or more periods may replicate
the true methods that are used in developing a personal savings strategy.

Several of these

regressions were in fact undertaken, but the results were anything but conclusive. Even more
strife with the problem of multicollinearity, these models had diminished r-squared values and
virtually no significant independent variables. Hardly any conclusions could be reached after a
review of this sampling of alternative regressions, however future endeavors may aim to quantify
which historical data is most used in orchestrating a personal savings agenda. Utilizing this
information, a more substantial model may be developed and the resulting influence of the Social
Security factors on personal savings levels as well as on the marginal rates of savings may be
more fully realized.
A separate concern that has never been adequately addressed by any of these modeling
attempts is the true composition of personal savings. It is taken for granted that all savings
addresses the needs of retirement and each of these models includes the level of aggregate
personal savings as a proxy for this variable. However, this is not really the case. In exploring
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the reasons behind savings, it is abundantly clear that retirement savings may make up only a
small token of any potential portfolio and its relative importance is largely dependent on the
stage of life in which the individual finds themselves. Savings, although defined as preparing for
the uncertainties of an unknown future, may take upon a largely short-sided aspect as well.
Younger adults are more likely to be accumulate funds with the goal of putting a down payment
on a house or meeting an unexpected emergency. As a family or individual progresses along in
their life, the focus of savings is often to finance higher education for their children or meeting
the needs of an unexpected job loss or career change. It is only after these needs have been met
that all but the most far-sighted individuals began preparing for their inevitable retirement.
While this has historically been the case for most individuals, recent developments have changed
the scope and awareness with respect to retirement. Such instruments as Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRAs) and 401(k) plans in which employers match employee contributions for
retirement have enticed a great many people to become more aware and diligent about
preparations for their golden years. As more data becomes available and the time series duration
lengthens, it will be interesting to see the effects that such alternative approaches to retirement
have had not just on personal savings levels, but on people’s attitudes about Social Security as
well.
The effect of Social Security factors on the marginal propensity to save may offer more
insight as to its measurable impact on savings habits. The adjustment of just a single variable in
the model, such as Social Security contributions, may allow a researcher to more clearly define
the subsequent impact of marginal increases in personal income with regards to savings. Future
modeling efforts may look to slightly alter the composition of the basic regression in order to
quantify the effects of changing Social Security factors with regard to other important economic
considerations, such as the price level or relative changes in wage levels. The effects of the
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previously mentioned lagged variables may also be interesting to note if they comprise a portion
of the basic regression model.
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CHAPTER VI: LOOKING TOWARD AN
UNCERTAIN FUTURE
Even including the poor performance of the stock market in the past ten years,
the long-term rate of return on equity investments has averaged more than
6 or 7 percentage points above the rate of inflation. Thus, as individuals are
forced to provide more of their retirement income than Social Security, they
are also being forced to invest in a program whose real rate of return is far
below what could be earned through a private retirement program.
—Robert Kaplan, Carnegie Mellon Economist (Ferrara).

Retirement systems that follow the premise of “pay-as-you-go” add nothing to the
production of a nation since none of these resources are essentially saved or invested (Ferrara
1985). The result is merely a transfer of funds from one segment of the population to the current
retirement constituency. The impact is that individuals may endure an opportunity cost of not
investing their income over the course of their working lives in the financial assets offered by the
private sector and the considerably higher returns these markets tend to offer.

In addition,

society may also be enduring a lost opportunity since an enormous amount of funds are not being
utilized in order to increase the productive capacity of our nation through expanded investment in
capital and labor.

The true measure of this impact would ultimately have to be derived by

comparing the expected increases in the expansion of this productive capacity as opposed to the
opportunities now being afforded to society with these funds being managed through a
government program.
The prospects of such potential returns within a compulsory plan drive right to the heart
of the essential problems associated with the current structure of Social Security.

Today’s

average recipient receives seven times the amount of contributions they made over their working
life (O’Reilly 1995). However, such an amazing return on the “investment” of one’s payroll
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taxes is quickly beginning to deteriorate.

As the nation becomes grayer and the burden of

retirement payments is borne by an increasingly smaller work force, the prospects for future
benefits that even approach the levels enjoyed by today’s retirees is slim at best.

Current

estimations are that the payment of benefits will start to exceed the receipts of payroll taxes by
the year 2013. The Social Security Trust Fund, where all excess contributions are currently
invested, will exhaust its reserves by the year 2029 (Hage 1995). Such estimations may be
overly optimistic when one considers the inability to account for such uncertainties as recessions,
collapse of financial institutions, or other economic calamities.

The prospect for future

retirement benefits is so bleak, that more people under the age of thirty-five believe in
unidentified flying objects than believe the notion that Social Security will be solvent when they
retire (Hull 1995).

Chilean Innovations in State Retirement Benefits
The country of Chile experienced the same ominous future for its compulsory retirement
plan in the early 1980s. After modeling their original program along the same lines as our Social
Security system, they realized a few decades later that demographic imbalances would surely
bankrupt their entire government unless major reforms were undertaken. Instead of relying on
small incremental changes that only aim to save the current level of benefits at the expense of a
future generation’s wages, they chose a more radical approach.

The Chilean government

completely scrapped their former system in favor of a welfare system for retirees in poverty
coupled with a private investment plan for each of the members of their working population.
Each worker contributes ten percent of their pre-tax salary into a private pension plan which he
or she chooses (Koselka 1991). Chileans may pick any one of ten separate investment plans,
closely monitored by the government and covering the entire spectrum of investment risk.
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Early critics of the system quickly condemned its prospects, stating the average peasant
could not understand the intricacies of investment markets and would have nothing to show for
their efforts upon retirement. A little more than a decade later, the average Chilean worker now
retires with a net worth that is four times their average income. Compare this to the retiree in our
country whose net worth is usually only equal to a single year of income. Their national savings
rate has risen from the anemic levels long experienced by the United States, to an astounding rate
of twenty-nine percent (Hull 1995).

Upon retirement, the Chilean worker can purchase an

annuity or organize an individual payment schedule in order to live off of the interest of their
contributions.

The high returns and new found appreciation for the power of compounding

interest rates have spurred many people to contribute even more than is required by law (Koselka
1991).

Success is based on the very simple and reasonable principle that people care
about their money. That they will work harder if they see the benefit to
themselves and that putting it into private hands is more efficient than
with the government.
—Antonio Iglesias, Chief Economist fo r Pension Fund (Koselka 1991).

Ironically, the blueprint for the Chilean retirement system was devised by prominent
free-market economists from Harvard, MIT, and the University of Chicago (Koselka 1991).
Knowing that such a radical change would be met with contempt in this country, they marketed
their plan to more progressive minds south of the border.

The Chileans have had such

resounding success that Argentina, Australia, and Sweden are all developing similar systems to
replace their respective social insurance retirement plans (Koselka 1991).
The Chilean example could never work in this country, or so contend many critics of this
successful venture. They are a third world country that can realize more immediate gains from
the influx of capital that such a system produces. They are not burdened with generations of
workers expecting at least the same standard of living of today’s retirees. Lastly, the Chilean
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system was instituted by a dictator who did not have to answer at the voting booths to angry
elderly masses that turn against individuals who tamper with their benefits.
To some extent, these critics understand the magnitude of establishing a retirement
system as radical as the Chileans. The Social Security Administration has estimated that the
federal government would have to pay a bill in excess of eight trillion dollars in order to liquidate
the current system and establish a private system (Hage 1995).

Since this amount is

approximately equal to six times the entire current federal budget, such an alternative is clearly
not acceptable. However, one should consider these costs to be borne by the Social Security
system regardless of whether an alternative plan is implemented, since the figure is merely an
estimate of future benefits that will have to be paid. If not now, then in the future. If reforms
could be enacted today that would alleviate the cost of operating the Social Security system
tomorrow, than such revisions should most certainly be examined.

Demographic Trends and Other Impending Challenges
Social Security has always been considered part of the “three legged stool” that would be
utilized to guarantee a comfortable journey into one’s retirement years.

Along with a solid

company pension plan and a carefully planned personal savings portfolio, individuals would be
well taken care of long after they no longer could provide productive labor services
(La Plante 1995). However, the continued uncertainty about the future of Social Security and
with the same burdensome demographic challenges facing most company pension plans, the onus
has been placed on the individual to provide a nest egg for their retirement. Ironically, the very
systems that were supposed to mitigate uncertainty about one’s golden age, Social Security and
pensions, are now cause for the greatest amount of consternation.
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The demographic factors bearing down on the ability of Social Security to meet its future
obligations are not so much due to the constant increase in this country’s life expectancy rate.
These rates are based on the population of the entire country and their continual increase could
actually strengthen the capacity of the current Social Security system. If the average individual
is expected to live at least until the age of retirement, than we should be able to count on many
decades of contributions into the system while they are part of the country’s labor force.
The true cause for concern is the amount of years an individual can be expected to live
after they have reached the age of retirement coupled with increases in the elderly population as
compared to the whole. Once an individual reaches the age of sixty-five, they can expect to live
for seventeen more years (Census 1995). In addition, the population of those aged eighty-five
and over, well beyond this country’s stated life expectancy, is increasing at an astounding pace 274% from the years 1960 to 1994 (Census 1995). In effect, the fastest growing proportion of
our population are those individuals that can expect to receive Social Security benefits for twenty
years or more, total benefits received far exceeding any contributions made during their working
lives. This is not even considering that the Baby Boomers are not expected to began retiring
until after the turn of the century. Once this enormously sized generation starts to apply for
benefits between the years 2010 and 2030, the average annual increase in the number of elderly
will effectively double. According to the calculations of one estimate, by the year 2050 one in
every five Americans will be considered part of this elderly population (Census 1995). Adding
to the level of anxiety is the fact that the post-Baby Boomer generation is not even comparable in
size, yet they will be expected to finance the retirement benefits of their predecessors if the
current “pay-as-you-go” scheme remains intact.
In order to meet these challenges of the not too distant future, several economists have
put forth some rather radical ideas. The most obvious solution to some would be to simply
discontinue the separation between Social Security contributions and general revenue taxation
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for the government.

The reason being that for years politicians have used the trust fund’s

investment in treasury bills to finance the immediate needs of government. The elimination of
this illusory difference between the revenues would yield a more realistic accounting of the
actual budget deficit, since Social Security “surpluses” could no longer be applied in order to
lessen the budgetary shortfalls. However, the discontinuation of this division between regular
government programs and Social Security may have a disheartening affect upon the millions of
workers contributing to the system. According to one economist, allowing the Social Security
Trust Fund to be folded into general revenues would make little economic difference, but could
have far reaching symbolic significance. The impression that they are providing for their own
future cushions the impact of contributing to the trust fund and may actually make them willing
to pay more in taxes (Penner 1989).
The termination of this division in government revenues may have an associated adverse
affect as well. By allowing the Social Security Trust Fund to be included in the accounting
ledger of the federal government, under the title of “off-budget” income, the actual level of
annual deficits is masked. Unleashing the true size of these deficits could require the immediate
need for higher taxes to pay for the effects of all previously unpublished spending. The result of
these increased taxes would be a decreased ability to save due to the reduction in disposable
income (Penner 1989). In the most mysterious of ways, the continuation of the Social Security
system in its present state may actually be promoting a higher level of personal savings by
masking the true size of the federal budget deficit.
Another proposed solution would be to increase the flow of immigration to the United
States.

This would have the immediate effect of raising the ratio of workers to the retired

population and would diminish the great demographic problem that seems destined to bankrupt
Social Security (Penner 1989). An added benefit, according to the author, is that first generation
immigrants have historically had higher birth rates than established citizens and this could further
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the proliferation of a larger work force in the coming years. He does not address, however, such
basic concerns as finding adequate jobs for this new influx of citizens or the cost of providing
education and other necessary public services for the next generation of workers.
Some economists simply do not see what all the fuss is about with regards to reforming
Social Security. The increased burden on future workers is considered by some to be quite small
when compared to the overall size of the Gross Domestic Product or aggregate total wages. In
fact, Henry Aaron calculated that in the year 2060, the required tax rate to fully fund the system
would only be 14.7% (Penner 1989). This differs quite substantially from the findings of several
economists who calculated Social Security contribution rates in excess of 40% for the current
generation of young workers once they near retirement (Hull 1995). The wide range of these
calculations may be attributed to differing perceptions regarding the health of the trust fund. In
Aaron’s study it was presupposed that the healthy surpluses of the past would allow Social
Security benefits to remain constant with only minimal increases in the taxation rate simply by
utilizing the reserves of the trust fund. Conversely, if one believes that the trust fund has been
used to finance general revenue programs over the past several decades, then the only means to
continue to operate Social Security will be through payroll deductions, and the current rate will
have to be increased dramatically to account for changing demographic trends. A small minority
of economists have even contended that continued surpluses in the Social Security system could
eventually erase the federal deficit problem.
While such radical measures may not be entirely necessary, it does stand to reason that
the Social Security system needs to be modified in order to meet the demands of the coming
millennium. The canvas of American life has changed substantially over the course of the past
six decades, but the largest of government programs has not always been swift in meeting these
new challenges. Life expectancy when the original act was enacted stood at 63 years. Today the
rate is approaching 72 years for men and 79 years for women and there is every indication that
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the expectancy will continue to rise as medical advancements flourish (La Plante 1995). With
such an increase in the expected life span of an American citizen, one would expect a correlated
increase in the date at which benefits are assumed to begin. Milton Friedman has long been an
advocate of raising the minimum age of receiving benefits until individuals have reached their
seventies in order to counter the effects of this increased life expectancy. However, this has not
been the case. While there currently exists a penalty for receiving benefits earlier than 65 years
of age and this mandated age is slated to increase by a full year in the very near future, such
small modifications have been met with stem criticism and rebuke by the potent elderly political
constituency.
Remedies may also focus on strengthening the sometimes forgotten “third leg” of
retirement preparation in hopes of alleviating the burden on Social Security and distraught
company pensions plans. Enticing individuals to save could do much to diminish the level of
dependence on a government retirement stipend and make future prospects for reform much
easier to enact. Such measures as increasing in the tax benefits of IRAs and 401(k) plans and
decreasing or eliminating the capital gains taxes could provide the necessary impetus that many
need to initiate a personal savings plan. However, such a revision to the current tax code does
not solely impact future reliance on Social Security, and may have a much more immediate effect
on the current level of general revenues. Even though the ultimate gains of decreasing reliance
on Social Security could be quite substantial, many citizens and elected representatives would be
very reluctant to suffer the consequences of decreasing general revenues in the present in order to
achieve this goal.
Real reform will have to embody a long range outlook to the nation’s economic future
and be constructed to weather strong criticism from those expecting at least the same level of
benefits as their predecessors. However, politicians possess notoriously short time horizons and
events projected for the next century often have only trivial effects on the decisions of today
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(Penner 1989).

The current prospects for reform have been embodied in recent bipartisan

legislation brought to the U.S. Congress by Senator Bob Kerrey (D - Nebraska) and Senator Alan
Simpson (R - Wyoming). The cornerstone of their proposal is the investment of two percent of
the current payroll deduction into a Personal Investment Plan endorsed by the government (Cruz
1995). The authors of the bill believe this could provide for the current stream of benefits, while
establishing a personal nest egg for future retirees. Such a system is modeled to some extent
after the successful 401(k) and 403(b) retirement plans that have gained enormous popularity
over the past several decades. Instead of burdening the future growth of their businesses with
tomorrow’s pension checks, many firms are opting to harness the growth of private investments
to provide for these workers as they progress into their golden years. The implementation of
such a program in the infancy of Social Security may well have averted much of the difficulties
that we are currently experiencing.
Whatever reform is eventually embraced, we should hope that it exemplifies the original
intentions of President Roosevelt and his commission. Providing a basic stipend paid through
the contributions of our work force in order to prevent a great many retirees with being
confronted with the horrors of poverty during their later years. Somehow the citizens of this
country must be persuaded that if we continue with the current policies, we are treating future
generations very badly relative to how our predecessors have treated us (Penner 1989).
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16.350%
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-3.232%

1970
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-20.668%

-18.318%

34.974%

1987

6.020%
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-4.634%
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1959

$152.1

24.092%

1960

$158.7

-2.666%

1961

$148.7

18.657%

1962

$173.1

-5.870%

1963

$186.7

12.007%

1964

$238.4

16.459%

1965

$261.5

8.357%

1966

$303.4

-3.300%

1967

$301.8

7.823%

1968

$286.6

7.364%
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1969

$277.2

-0.871%

1970

$289.8

-14.943%

1971

$294.2

18.109%

1972

$333.5

11.100%

1973

$398.9

- 1.621%

1974

$286.0

-22.880%

1975

$324.7

3.995%

1976

$334.7

18.396%

1977

$367.2

-3.735%

1978

$358.5

-2.220%

1979

$359.4

7.280%

1980

$311.9

15.309%

1981

$326.9

7.804%

1982

$310.4

-6.513%

1983

$364.5

33 .999 %

1984

$404.6

0.031%

1985

$427.4

16.440%

1986

$488.4

26.493%

1987

$396.1

21.363%

1988

$377.5

-7.335%

1989

$441.0

21.464%
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YEAR
1990

PS A V E ^
$392.9

A W ^G E
3.640%

1991

$332.4

12.430%

1992

$387.8

10.516%

1993

$327.5

8.580%

All Dollar Figures are Stated in 1987 Constant Dollars Unless Otherwise Noted.
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